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On Cedillo was seriously 
Yet, to 
recover the amount · 
an to the District Court. and the 
a 
an 
Insurance Company of 
policy limits 
crash caused by an 
due her under her 
amount on March 23, 5 
to present her claim to 
finally received the 
date), following this 
s 
on bad 
That Farmers and 
2. That her claim was not fairly debatable; 
213 15 ). 
denied or withheld payment; 
3. That Farmers' denial or failure to pay was not the result of a good faith 
mistake; and 
4. The resulting harm to Cedillo was not fully compensable by the UIM contract 
damages awarded by the Arbitrator. 
Robinson v. State Farm A:fut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 176 45 P.3d 829, 832 (2002). 
Cedillo appeals from the District Court's ruling which allowed Farmers to withhold 
~~,HVUL" claimed as privileged; from the District Court's ruling granting summary judgment to 
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s 
§ 1- ). 
IL 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
appeal is 
See. V. 
remanded to the District Court 
discovery and 
on bad faith 
Appendix. 
electronically prior appeal 41 ). 
Idaho Supreme Court. In the 
154,345 P.3d 213 15). 
proceedings on Cedillo 's bad faith 
District Court granted Farmers' 




No. CV-2013-8697). As such, the Clerk's Record in this appeal (No. 43890) now 
includes tlie Augmented Clerk's Record in the prior appeal (No. 41638), which consists of pages 
1-679; the Clerk's Record in this appeal (No. 43890), which consists of pages 1-2337; the 
Supplemental Clerk's Record in this appeal (No. 43890), which consists of pages 1-27; and the 
Sealed Documents. 
For citation and reference the Augmented Clerk's Record in the prior appeal (No. 41638) 
will be identified as "Farmers R., p " and the Clerk's Record in this appeal (No. 43890) will 





was valuation claim. 
On February 10, 2012, the parties appointed l\,fr Merlyn Clark as Arbitrator in this 
was asked to resolve s bodily injuries suffered by 
crash of May Farmers R .. p. 60 L 
On L 201 Cedillo 's , Jon Steele ("Steele''), provided his Notice 
Disclosure to Farmers and to Arbitrator Clark. Farmers R., pp. 605-607. 
Each 
hearing was held on November 20-2 L 12. Cedillo ·s witnesses included 
treating physicians: Dr. D.C.: 
surgery on s 
perfo1med two surgeries on 
Cedillo' s treating physicians appeared 
Thomas orthopedic 
\1. Little, a 
videotaped testimony. The 
videotaped testimony 
Record at R. p 2031. 
Dr. Price, D.C., Dr. Goodwin and Dr. Little is found in the Clerk's 
Farmers' defense included the boilerplate insurance company defenses of pre-existing 
condition and/or aggravation of a preexisting condition requiring, if proven, apportionment of 
Cedilla's medical expenses. Farmers R., p. 44, 52, and 57. For that reason Cedilla's treating 
physicians provided medical testimony that refuted Fanners' pre-existing and/or aggravation of 
pre-existing condition defenses. Farmers R., p. 39, 47, 48, 49, 52, and 57. 
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was 
had this to explicitly and 
a. Dr. \Vilson's testimony. according to 
upon speculation." Farmer R., p. 52. 
Dr. \Vil son's testimony " ... was not supported 
evidence.'' Fanners R" p. 52, 
C. The Arbitrator'' ... does not accept the 
lil 
a. 




rejecting Dr. Wilson's 





Clark had this to say rejecting Ms. Purvis' testimony: 
a. Ms. Purvis did not quantify any amount of lost income. 
Farmers R., p. 59. 
b. Ms. Purvis' opinions concerning Cedilla's wage loss was" ... not based 
on or supported by the relevant evidence." Farmers R., p. 59. 
c. The Arbitrator found" ... no evidence to support any claim that Cedillo 
failed to mitigate her loss of income ... " Farmers R., p. 58. 
The only medical issues on which Farmers received a favorable ruling from the 
Arbitrator was his decision disallowing $12,523. 50 of Cedillo' s medical expenses, and the 
Page4 
determined 
expenses. was to recover $ 12 1 
the 
$ 135,000.Go in 
(Fam1ers R __ p. 57-59). for a total 




On April 29, 2013, Arbitrator Clark issued 
A 29. 13 was 
of S l 95 
Farmers R .. p. 77. 
During the arbitration proceedings, Farmers 
()/) 
medical 
to recover $13 
economic damages. 
00 · m 
The 
damages for a total interim award 
(Farmers R., pp. 65-78). 
challenged award of prejudgment 
interest by its contention that Cedillo should be required to file a new proof of loss for each 
surgery, which would change the starting date for the accrnal of interest, resulting in significantly 
less prejudgment interest. Farmers R., p. 73. Arbitrator Clark rejected this argument as ''[n]o 
such requirement is imposed by law or the insurance contract that was issued to [Cedillo] and 
there is no public policy reason why a new proof of loss should be required for each new medical 
procedure received by [Cedillo]." Farmers R .. p. 73. 
Farmers' next challenge to the Arbitrator's award of$ l 03,468. 41 as prejudgment interest 




s l 1 .. - 46 t $" - 719 16 . .)). 0 .)),, .• 
prejudgment 
vvas flatly rejected. Farmers R .. pp. 495, 523 
on 30,2013. filed its second for reconsideration and for 
Arbitrator Clark· s prejudgment 
fifth time, Arbitrator Clark rejected Fanners' 
Farmers R., po. 570-
Farmers R., pp. 
issued 
and to Set 
Clark's 
The first four written decisions is the Arbitrator's A.Hard issued on 
January 16, 2013. The of 12 for economic and 
noneconomic damages was then subject to adjustment for payments that had 
been made to Cedillo and for prejudgment interest. _____ _ 
Cedillo and Farmers then submitted briefing to the Arbitrator concerning 
adjustment for payments that had been made to Cedillo and for the method to 
be used for the calculation of prejudgment interest. R .. p. 66; Farmers R .. pp. 
65-77. 
3. The Arbitrator's second written opinion is the Arbitrator's Final Award issued 
on April 29, 2013. The Final Award adjusted the Interim Award for payments 
that had been received by Cedillo and confirmed that Farmers still Cedillo 
damages in the principle amount of $100,332.95 , plus prejudgment interest in 
the amount of $103,135.46, and that these amounts had been properly 
calculated under the applicable law and facts as applied by the Arbitrator. 




Farmers then, on May 20, 2013, submitted its Motion for Reconsideration of 
Prejudgment Interest Award in which it sought reduction of the prejudgment 
interest award of $103,135.46 to $35,719. 16. and 
The Arbitrator found that Farmers' motion was not made under 
I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B). Farmers R., p. 551. However, it was timely under 
Idaho Code§ 7-909, which requires that an application to modify or correct an 
award must be brought within twenty (20) days after delivery of the award to 
the applicant. Farmers R., p. 552. 
6. The Arbitrator's third written decision, Arbitrator's Final Order No. 12 RE: 
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Prejudgment Interest Award and 
Claimant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Counsel for Respondent and the 
Amended Final Award was issued on July 24, 2013. Farmers R., p. 562. 
7. Farmers then, on July 30, 2013, filed in the arbitration its second motion for 
reconsideration of Arbitrator Clark's award of prejudgment interest. Farmers 
R., pp. 570-577. This was Farmers' fifth challenge to the Arbitrator's award 
of prejudgment interest. 
8. The Arbitrator's Final Order No. 13 RE: Respondent's Application to Jvlodijj; 
or Correct Amended Final Award and/or Motion for Reconsideration, issued 
on August 21, 2013, rejected Farmers' prejudgment interest challenge 
arguments for the fifth time. Farmers R., pp. 585-590. 
Meanwhile, following the issuance of Arbitrator Clark's Final Award on April 29, 2013, 
Cedillo had filed her PetitionfiJr Confirmation ofArbitration Award and Award of Attorney Fees 
in the District Court on May 13, 2013. Farmers R. 1 pp. 6-88. 
On August 16, 2013, Cedillo filed her First Amended Petition .fiJr Confirmation of 
Arbitration Award, Award <~{Attorney Fees, Unenforceability <~l Offset Clause and Bad Faith 
(hereatter "First Amended Petition"), which was served on Farmers on August 16, 2013. On 
August 20, 2013, Cedillo's first set of discovery, which consisted of interrogatories, requests for 
production of documents, and requests for admission, was served on Farmers. (Farmers R. pp. 
27-59). Pursuant to LR.C.P. 33(a) (2), 34 (b) (2), and 36 (a), Farmers discovery responses were 
due on September 19, 2013. 
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8, 201 Farmers filed the District Court its Motion for Modffication 
to 
for the sixth time, Clark's award of 
prejudgment interest. 
On September 11, 2013, Farmers made a fourth voluntary payment of $101,947.96 but 
also made the vexatious threat to seek repayment of this amount. Farmers R .. p. 658. 
While the District Court was addressing the issues regarding the arbitration award, the 
parties were engaged in discovery related to the bad faith issues. On November 25, 2013, 
Cedillo filed her Motion to Compel with supporting documentation (R. p. 20), consisting of 
copies of the discovery requests at issue, along with copies of four discovery letters sent to 
Farmers' counsel. 
In her first discovery letter (dated August 29, 2013), Cedillo gave Farmers an extension 
to provide discovery responses until October 15, 2013. R. p. 60. The second discovery letter 
(dated October 23, 2013) requested outstanding discovery responses be provided no later than 
November 18, 2013. R. p. 61. 
On November 9, 2013, District Judge Norton issued the court's Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Motions on Arbitration Award. The District Court's decision confirmed the 
arbitration award and awarded Cedillo attorney fees of $121,007. 23 . In the arbitration process 
Cedillo incurred arbitration costs of $52,699. 79 . Although she sought reimbursement of these 
costs from Farmers, the District Court found that costs were not recoverable under the terms of 
Farmers' UIM contract. 
Cedillo's third discovery letter (dated November 11, 2013), agam requested Farmers' 
responses to her outstanding discovery. R.p. 62. Cedillo's fourth letter (dated November 13, 
Page 8 
20 l discussed a phone call between Cedillo's and Farmers counsel, in which objections were 
no 
November 13. once again failed to Cedillo with any 
responses. Three days later, on November 25, 2013, Cedillo filed her Motion to Compel. ~ 
20. Cedillo's Motion to Compel was scheduled to be heard by the District Court on December 
11, 2013. On December 6, 2013, Farmers provided Cedillo with its initial discovery responses. 
Farmers' responses included over four thousand pages of documents and a privilege log listing 
many additional pages of documents which were claimed as privileged and were withheld from 
Farmers' production. 
Judgment in the amount of $126,478. 01 was entered on December 11, 2013. On that 
same day, December 11, 2013 (the day of the hearing on Cedillo's ~Motion to Compel), Farmers 
filed its Notice of Appeal. Farmers R., pp. 663-666. . The District Court then entered its stay 
until remittitur was received from the Idaho Supreme Court. Farmers R., p. 668-669. 
The court's Judgment of $126,478.01 , consisted of $5,608.30 as the unpaid balance of the 
Adjusted Interim Award, attorney fees of $121,007.23, and $132.48 as interest through November 
22, 2013. Farmers R., pp. 660-661. 
On appeal, Farmers challenged, for the seventh time Arbitrator Clark's award of 
prejudgment interest. On March 5, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court, in a unanimous 5-0 decision, 
affirmed the District Court's confirmation of the arbitration, affirmed Arbitrator Clark's award of 
damages and prejudgment interest, and the District Court's award of attorney fees to Cedillo. 
The Idaho Supreme Court issued its Remittitur on March 27, 2015. 
Following remand, on April 7, 2015, Cedillo sent Farmers her fifth discovery letter 
outlining deficiencies in Farmers' discovery responses. R. p. 199-204. 
Page 9 
Even discovery continued to be resulting m 
011 
011 9, 1 
In support of her Renewed Motion to Compel, Cedillo submitted the Declaration of Irving 
Paul in Support of Plaint[fl's Renewed A1otion to Compel. R., pp. 380-384. Mr. Paul had served 
as an expert witness in nearly one hundred bad faith cases, including cases which he was hired 
by the attorneys representing Farmers in this case. As this Declaration was filed just six (6) days 
prior to the hearing date, it was not considered by the District Court in its discovery opinion and 
decision of July 17, 2015. ~ 388. Yet, Mr. Paul's Declaration will assist the Court in 
analyzing Farmers' privilege claims and was relied upon in support of Cedillo's Motion for In 
Camera Review. R., p. 395. 
Mr. Paul's Declaration states that "[i]n general, in all cases I have been involved in, I 
have been provided with the complete paper and electronic claims file involved, subject to 
certain well defined exceptions." Mr. Paul then addresses the "major exception" to the discovery 
rule requiring production of the insurer's complete paper and electronic claims file: 
"8. The maJor exception have experienced has been the 
attorney/client and work product privilege. I have generally not been 
provided with records of communications between the carrier and its attorney 
covering legal advice. 
* * * * * 
In my experience the fact that an attorney labels a communication as 
privileged does not make it so. Since the carrier has the responsibility for 
evaluating and paying claims, and since IC 41-1329 applies to carriers, there 
must be sufficient discovery to allow the trier of fact to determine what the 
carrier did and did not do, and whether this conduct was consistent with the 
carrier's statutory and common law obligations. In summary, then, in my 
experience courts have always given me access to written or electronic 
records that constitute the best evidence as to why and how the carrier made 
the decisions it made. In this case I need to know how, when, and why 
Farmers reached the valuations it did. 
10 
* * * * * 
seem to be issues case as to 
is entitled to documents 
apparently the beginning of arbitration. In 
ordered discovery for actions taking place in terms of administering the 
claim, but not for actions directly related to litigation. In this case I am 
informed that the arbitration was concluded on August 21, 2013, (See, Final 
Order No. 13 re; Respondent's Application to Modify or Correct Amended 
Final .LA\.\vard and/or l\1otion for Reconsideration). In this case the Supreme 
Court has stated that it is already res judicata that Farmers had sufficient 
information to determine its payment on this claim as of August 25, 2009, yet 
Farmers made a payment of $155,000 on October 18, 2012, while the 
arbitration process was underway. This $155,000 was voluntarily made by 
Farmers , and was not the result of a court order. The decision to pay this 
amount is then, by definition, a claims decision, and occurred over three 
years after Farmers had sufficient information to evaluate the claim. It is 
therefore necessary for me to form an opinion as to whether this admitted 
delay of over three years was intentional and unreasonable. I am not a mind 
reader, and the data I would look at to form this opinion would be the claims 
activity during this three year interim. Did Farmers get additional 
information, and if so what was that information? Was this information 
available three years earlier? Why did Farmers change from paying $25,000 
to paying $180,000? The source of answers to those questions is the claims 
file ... subject to redaction for non-waived, attorney/client privilege on truly 
legal issues or issues of litigation strategy. I am advised that Farmers made 
two additional voluntary payments, the latest of $101,947 on September 11, 
2013. Again, what if anything changed? Clearly the claims process was in 
full swing through late September of 2013. 
12. I am further advised that as a result of the March 5, 2015, Idaho Supreme 
Court decision, Farmers made several additional payments. [ need enough 
data to determine if these payments were reasonable and timely under the 
circumstances. R., p. 375-378. 
Even without considering Mr. Paul's Declaration, the District Court was convinced that 
Cedillo was entitled to an order compelling discovery. R. p. 386~394. I lowcver, the District 
Court understandably found it difficult to determine what had been produced and what had not; 
or what was outstanding under which discovery request, making it difficult for the District Court 
to issue a specific and cogent order. R,pJ9Q. 
11 
a could only determine that a 
to 




which had been filed on November 25, 2013, and granted her Renewed Nfotion to Compel, which 
had been filed on May 28, 2015. R. p. 393. The District Court Order to Compel specifically 
addressed Farmers' electronically stored information ("ESI"), as Farmers' counsel had not yet 
made any inquiry into whether some requested ESI existed or in what form it may have existed. 
R. p. 391. The District Court ordered Farmers to identify whether any responsive ESI existed 
and to the extent it existed, to disclose it, and to disclose how it was stored, no later than July 31, 
2015. R. p. 391. 
Although Cedilla's briefing and oral argument had addressed the specific issues of 
Farmers' claims of attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, the District Court 
determined that it was not yet addressing these specific issues. R. p. 391-392. The District 
Court also stated, in response to Cedillo's argument that all objections had been waived, that 
'[a]bsent instruction from the Idaho Supreme Court that late objections are waived, the Court 
does not accept (Ccdillo's contention) that the Idaho discovery rules mandates late objections be 
waived.'' R. p. 392. The District Court then set an additional discovery hearing for August 20, 
2015, to address further issues relating to Cedillo's motions to compel. R. p. 393. 
Between July 17, 2015 and the date of the follow-up hearing on August 20, 2015, Cedillo 
and Farmers continued to discuss discovery issues, and further productions were made. 
On July 9, 2015, Farmers produced documents which had previously been claimed as 
privileged and its second privilege log. R. p. 484. On July 17, 2015, Farmers produced an 
additional 100 pages of documents that had previously been claimed as privileged, as well as its 
Page I 
third privilege log. July 2015, Cedillo to her 
In furtherance of the District Court's order concerning ESI, Cedillo proposed search 
terms and a timeline to Farmers. Cedillo also requested that Farmers provide her its search 
methodology and method of verification. R. p. 404. Ifowever, there was again a dispute 
regarding production of certain documents which Farmers claimed were privileged. Cedillo then 
filed her Motion for In Camera Review of Documents claimed as privileged, with supporting 
declaration. R. p. 395. Farmers filed a response to Cedillo's Motion for In Camera Review(~[ 
Documents with a copy of its fourth and most recent privilege log (the "Second Amended 
Supplemental Privilege Log"), Supp. Clerk's R., pp. l 0-25. At the same time, Farmers filed 
under seal with the District Court a copy of all documents that had been withheld under claims of 
privilege. Farmers also submitted to the District Court all of the documents which Farmers had 
produced in redacted form and a second set of unredacted documents. 
Following the District Court's in ccunera review and analysis of Farmers' withheld 
documents, on September 16, 2015, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting in Part Cedillo 's Renewed Motion to Compel. R. pp. 490-506. This decision 
ordered Farmers to produce an additional l 81 pages of documents. _&_IL:±20-506. 
On October 16, 2015, Farmers filed its Motion/hr Partial Summary Judgment concerning 
Cedillo's claim that the set-off clause found in Farmers insurance contract at endorsement 
Ell 79i was unenforceable. R. p. 518. 
On November 5, 2015, Cedillo filed her cross Motion for Summwy Judgment which 
contended that Farmers' set-off clause was inapplicable as the result or Judge Gerald Schroeder's 
Page 13 
case Talbot v. 987 ( 1999). 
on 
Ill, dated November 30, 2015. However, it granted summary judgment not on the merits of 
Famers' contentions but rather that Cedillo had waived this claim. R. p. 1126-1140. 
On December 8, 2015, Farmers filed its A1otionfor Summary Judgment on Cedillo's bad 
faith claim. Farmers' Motion for Summmy Judgment was based exclusively on the "fairly 
debatable" element of Cedillo's bad faith claim. R. p. 1145-1165. 
As stated by the District Court, "[b ]ecause whether a claim is fairly debatable is a factual 
issue, a Defendant can only obtain Su'mmary Judgment on this issue if there is no material 
question of fact." R. p. 2294. The District Court also stated, "[t]hus, at Summary Judgment 
when addressing the fairly debatable issue, the Court is determining whether there is a question 
of fact about a question of fact." R. p.2301. 
In support of its motion, Farmers submitted to the District Court the affidavits of Dr. 
Richard Wilson, Dr. Mark Williams, and Shannon Purvis. These three defense experts are the 
same exact defense experts whose arbitration testimony was entirely rejected as "based upon 
speculation," whose opinions were unsupported by the evidence, based upon the "possibilities," 
and not based on or supported by the relevant evidence. 
On December 24, 2015 Cedillo filed her opposition to Farmers' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which consisted of the following: 
• Cedillo' s h,:r:pert Witness Disclosure. R. p. 1892. 
• Irving "Buddy" Paul's Expert Report. R __ p. 1877-1886. 
• Deposition of Irving "Buddy" PauL fC p. 1877-1886. 
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Motion to Strike. 
in 
• 1\:femorandum in Support (~f Plaintdf's Motion to Strike. 
• Cedillo 's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion fhr Summary 
Judgment. R., p 1804-1813. 
• Declaration cif Jon 1vf Steele in Support of Plaintiff's 1\10/ion fhr Leave to 
Amend Complaint to Add Claims for Punitive Damages and Negligent 
Adjustment of U/Jvf Claim. R., p.1815-2302. 
On January 8, 2016 the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Summary Judgment on Bad Faith Claim and Allowing, in Part, 
Amendment c?f the Complaint. R., p. 2280-2302. 
This decision denied Cedillo's motion to amend her complaint to include punitive 
damages, and granted summary judgment to Farmers on Cedillo's bad faith claim, yet allowed 
Cedillo to amend her complaint to include a count of negligent adjustment of Cedillo's UIM 
claim. Cedillo declined the opportunity to amend her complaint (R. p. 2303) and the District 
Court entered a Final Judgment on January 22, 2016. R., p. 2312. 
Cedillo filed her Notice of Appeal on January 12, 2016 (R. p. 2306), and her Amended 
Not ice ofAppeal on February 22, 2016 (R. p. 23 16). 
On March 16, 2016, this court issued its Order to Augment Prior Appeal No. 41683. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 25, 2008, Cedillo was injured while riding as a passenger on Jon Steele's 
motorcycle. The motorcycle drifted to the right and hit a concrete barrier. Cedillo later married 
Steele. Cedillo had been insured with Farmers for years and her insurance pol obligated 
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to resulting an 
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was to 
surgeon, Dr. Little, performed a C7-Tl anterior cervical decompression and fusion. Farmers R., 
IL21-
0n July 28, 2009, Cedillo sent Farmers her proof of loss letter stating that she had settled 
her claim against Steele for his policy limits. Her proof of loss letter then demanded the policy 
limits of $500,000 and asked that her claim be resolved in 30 days. 
Days after receiving Cedilla's proof of loss letter, the adjuster assigned to Cedilla's 
claim, Ron Ramsey ("Ramsey"), asked Farmers' attorney Thomson if Cedilla's July 28, 2009 
proof of loss letter received from Cedillo was valid. R. p. 1992. On August 02, 2009, Ramsey 
set the initial reserve on Cedilla's claim at $50,000. R. p. 1992. The next day Ramsey 
increased the reserve to $73,000. R. p. 1992. Just two days later, he then reduced the reserve to 
$33,000. R. p. 1992. On August 14, 2009 Farmers received Cedilla's first authorization for 
release of medical records. R. p. 1992. Over the next several years Cedillo provided Farmers 
additional medical releases. R. p. 1992. 
To recap, on August 2, 2009, Farmers set a reserve of $50,000 on Cedillo 's UIM claim. 
On the next day, August 3, 2009, Famers increased Cedilla's UIM claim reserve to $73,000. On 
August 5, 2009, Farmers dropped its reserve to $33,000. 
On August 27, 2009 Farmers' claim file notes that Cedillo has cooperated. R. p. 1993. 
On that same day (August 27, 2009), Farmers' attorney Thomson responded to Ramsey's 
inquiry that Cedilla's proof of loss letter complied with Idaho Code§ 41-1839. R. p. 1993. 
Yet, for the next 5 \/2 years (untii the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the Arbitrator and the District 
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on March 5, that Ccdillo's proof letter did not 
made 
to Court, and to 
On August 27, 2009 Farmers reviewed the medical records of Cedillo's surgeon, Dr. 
Little, and her chiropractic doctor, Dr. Price, who both agreed that Cedillo's injury at C7-Tl was 
a "new, acute" concern. R. p. 1993. Yet, for the next 3 Y2 years Farmers contended that 
Cedilla's injury was a pre-existing condition. Farmers ignored Cedilla's treating doctors' 
opinions and sought out hired actors to contradict the medical opinions of Cedilla's treating 
physicians. 
On August 28, 2009, Farmers sent Cedillo a check for $25,000.00, even though its 
reserve was set at $33,000. 00 . The reserve on Cedilla's UIM claim was then reduced to 
$8,000.00 . R. p. 1993. Farmers' letter accompanying its check stated the check was Farmers' 
valuation of Cedilla's UIM claim. Farmers then closed Cedilla's claim file. R. p. 1993. 
Farmers closed Cedilla's file when the only medical opinions in its possession unequivocally 
stated that Cedilla's injury was a "new, acute" injury, not a pre-existing condition or injury, and 
not an aggravation of a preexisting injury as it alleged in its defense of Cedillo's claim. When 
closed, Farmers file included Cedillo's medical expenses of over $53,000.00 . 
Farmers' policies required adjuster Ramsey to assist Cedillo and maintain contact with 
her. R. p. 1994. Ramsey did the exact opposite by closing Cedillo's file. 
After receiving Cedilla's letter of April 05, 2010, Farmers reopened her file. R. p. 1993. 
Farmers repeatedly asked for and received additional medical releases, additional medical 
records, and additional medical expenses. 
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requested additional medical expenses July and 
10. 
to a medical 
by Dr. Richard Wilson. R. p. 1995. On May 05, 2011, three years after the crash, Dr. 
Wilson evaluated Cedillo. 
On January 23, 2012, Farmers received Dr. Little's pre-surgery evaluation concerning 
Cedillo's need for a second neck surgery. R. p. 1995. Dr. Little's pre-surgery evaluation 
advised Farmers that Cedillo would need a second neck fusion. On February 15, 2012, Dr. 
Little performed a C5-C6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion. R. p. 1995. Farmers' file 
notes that Cedillo had a second fusion surgery on February 12, 2012, and that she also needs a 
shoulder surgery. R. p. 1995. On March 22, 2012, the reserve is increased to $100,000. &J2: 
1995. On May 22, 2012, Dr. Goodwin performed surgery on Ccdillo's right shoulder. 
On October 02, 2012, Cedillo was again examined by Dr. Wilson at Farmers' request 
and expense. R. p. 1995. On October 18, 2012 (16 days later), Farmers delivered to Cedillo's 
attorney its check for $155,000.00 . R. p. 1995. 
Farmers' attorney Thomson, in anticipation of the arbitration hearing which was just 
weeks away, then began his search for a doctor who would refute the opinions of Ccdillo's 
treating physicians surgeon. R. p. 1995. Attorney Thomson also sought out a hired actor to 
refute Ccdillo"s claim for lost income. R. p. l 995. 
Following the arbitration hearing on January 16, 2013, Arbitrator Clark issued the 
Arbitrator's Interim Award in Cedillo's favor $406.700. 12 . Farmers' 
attorney states "interest should be $3,991 or $7,884, or at worst, $40,000." R. p. 1997. On 
March 22, 2013, Farmers made its third voluntary payment of $100,332.95 . R. p. 1997. One of 
18 
!S payable to Cedillo, Regence Blue 
2 13, Arbitrator issued ·s 
Application to i\lfodify or Correct Amended Final Award and/or 1v!otion for Reconsideration, 
which flatly rejected, for the fifth time, Farmers' challenge to the Arbitrator's award of 
prejudgment interest. 
On August 20, 2013, Farmers was served with Cedillo's First Amended Petition. Motion 
to Co11firm Arbitration Aware!, and jhr an Award of Costs, Attorney Fees and Prejudgment 
Interest and Ccdillo's first set of discovery. 
On September 15, 2013, Farmers made its fourth voluntary payment of $101,947.96 . R. 
p. 1998. 
Even though its challenge to the award of prejudgment interest had been rejected six 
times by the Arbitrator, Farmers pursued its flawed interest theories and ridiculous mathematical 
calculations in the District Court and this Court. 
IV. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the District Court err, when, in its 1vfemorandum Decision and Order dated 
September 16, 2015, it allowed Farmers to withhold documents claimed as privileged? 
B. Did the District Court err, when, in its Memorandwn Decision and Order, dated January 
8, 2016, it granted Farmers Motionfor Summary Judgment on Ccdillo's bad faith claim? 
C. Did the District Court err, when, in its Memorandum Decision and Order dated January 
8, 2016, it denied Cedillo's motion for leave to amend her complaint to add a claim for 
punitive damages? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter of the 
litigation, whether it relates to claims or defenses or is reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. I.R.C. P. 26(b) (1 ). To obtain relevant discovery from an 
opposing party in the litigation, a party may serve a request for interrogatories or a request for 
production of documents I.R.C.P. 26(a), 33, and 34. If the documents requested arc not 
produced or interrogatories arc not answered, and the opposing party has been given 30 days 
from the date of service to respond, the party serving the discovery request may file a motion to 
compel discovery. I.R.C. P. 37(a) (2). 
The court has broad discretion in determining whether or not to grant a motion to compel. 
Nightingale v. Temple, 151 Idaho 347, 250 P.3r<l 755, 759 (2011). Such decisions will only be 
reversed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 [daho 
697, 701, 116 P. 31c1 27, 31 (2005). 
B. 
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with 
movmg J v. llarrison, l Idaho 86, 867 P 
(1994). This liberally construes the the party opposing 
A P.2d ( 110 
issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. City of !lalley, 119 
Idaho434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). 
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to 
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 
90, 867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when 
the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an clement essential to that party's case 
upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P.2d 
at 1037-38; Bade!! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing 
the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue for trial." IRCP 56(e) (emphasis 
added). "Creating only a slight doubt as to the facts will not defeat a summary judgment motion; 
a summary judgment will be granted whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a 
directed verdict would be warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as to the 
facts." Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541,549,691 P.2d 787, 795 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1984). More than a slight doubt as to the facts is needed to forestall summary judgment. 
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 87 L 452 P.2d 632, 368 ( 1969). "Flimsy 
or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which arc not genuine, or disputes as to 
matters of form do not create genuine issues which, will preclude summary judgment." Id. 
of 
The Supreme Court has said the purpose of Rule 15 is allow the best chance for each 
claim to be determined on its merits rather than on some procedural technicality; and, second, to 
relegate pleadings to the li111ited role of providing parties vvith notice of the nature of the 
pleader's claim and the facts that have been called into question." Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 
326, 715 P.2d 993,996 (1986) (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil 2d § 1471 (1971)). Courts are to heed the mandate that leave to amend shall be freely 
given. Id. (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, "it is I settled that, in the interest of 
justice, courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend." Wickstrom v. N Idaho Coll., 111 
[daho 450,453, 725 P.2d 155, 158 (1986). In addition, Idaho courts hold to the principle that 
"[ijf the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a Cedillo may be a proper subject of 
relict: he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits." Foman v. Davis, 
371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). adopted in Smith v. Great Basin 
Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272-73, 561 P.2d 1299, 1305-06 (1977). 
I Iowcver, the standard of liberality provided by IRCP I 5(a) is tempered in cases where a 
party seeks to amend to add a claim for punitive damages. Such cases arc instead governed by 
Idaho Code § 6-1604, which requires a claimant seeking to recover punitive damages to "prove, 
by clear and convincing evidence. oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct by 
the party against whom the claim for punitive damages is asserted." Idaho Code§ 6-1604(1). 
Indeed, "[pJunitivc damages arc not favored in the law and should be awarded in only the most 
unusual and compelling circumstances. Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & I!osp., 122 Idaho 47, 
1190 ( " P.A. 
l, 178 P.3d. 606, 614 Under s 6-1604 " s ' court shall to 
court 
at a reasonable at 
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." [d.; Idaho Code § 6-1604(2). 
Furthermore, in order to prevail on a motion to add a claim for punitive damages, the 
Cedillo must be able to "establish the requisite 'intersection of two factors: a bad act and a bad 
state of mind.' Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 503, 95 P.3d 977, 985 (2004) 
(citing Linscott v. Rainier Natl. L!fe Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (1980))." 
Id. at 250 and 178 P.3d at 615. 
Importantly, whether a party is allowed to assert a claim for punitive damages is not 
based upon the type of case or claim. Todd v. Sullivan Const. LLC, 191 P.3d 196, 201 (Idaho 
2008). "A prayer for punitive damages is not a stand-alone cause of action, but flows from an 
underlying cause of action, such as breach of contract or a tort, when the conduct of a party 
meets the threshold level of being oppressive and outrageous." Boise Tovver Assoc\· .. Ll,C v. 
Washington Cap. Joint Afaster Trust, 2006 WL 1749656, * 12 (D. Idaho 2006). 
Vl. 
A. 
Cedillo's claim for bad faith turns on whether Farmers handled her UIM claim good 
faith, including the investigation and evaluation of her claim, the value of her claim, the 
settlement decisions (if any), and the defense of her U!M claim in arbitration. As a consequence, 
the production of all documents, communications. papers, and things called for in Cedillo· s 
that bear on Farmers of at 
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Renewed Motion lo Compel. 
As an insurance company, Farmers is in a supcnor position and understands the 
important financial consequences of failing to fulfill its contractual duties to its insured. Sec 
White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 98, 730 P .2d l O 14, 1018-19 ([daho 1986). In 
first-party insurance situations the "contract and the nature of the relationship give the insurer an 
almost adjudicatory responsibility." Id. The insurer is responsible for evaluating the claim, 
determining whether the claim falls within the coverage provided, and determines whether to 
settle or litigate based on the merits. Id. "Although the insured is not without remedies if he 
disagrees with the insurer, the very invocation of those remedies detracts significantly from the 
protection or security which was the object of the transaction." Id .. 
This case presents the Court critically important issues that need to be resolved. Idaho 
courts, litigants and attorneys arc entitled to know the rules that district courts will apply to 
discovery litigation. 
The first issue to be resolved is whether under the facts of this case and the discovery 
rules may a district court, acting within its discretion, conclude that late discovery objections and 
privileges arc waived? 
The second issue to be resolved, is will this Court adopt the reasoning and conclusions of 
the Washington Supreme Court in the bad faith case of Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company ol 
Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686, 295 P.3d 239(2013). 
discovery is often the key to the unanswered questions 111 litigation. Cedillo contends that 
Farmers, as a result of its untimely and deficient responses, has waived any and all objections to 
Cedillo's discovery. Cedillo repeatedly advised Farmers of the deficiencies in its responses to 
Cedillo's discovery. Cedillo requests that this Court conclude that Farmers has waved any 
objection or privilege claim and that the Court order that Farmers respond without objection or 
privilege claim with all information responsive to each discovery request. 
In its Memorandum Decision of July 17, 2015, the District Court states that "[a]bscnt 
instruction from the Idaho Supreme Court that late objections are waived, the court docs not 
accept that the Idaho discovery rules mandates late objections be waived." Cedillo requests that 
the Court instruct the District Court, that in this case, Farmers' late objections and privilege 
claims have been waived. 
[t is well-established in the Ninth Circuit that any objections to a discovery request arc 
waived if not made in the time allotted by the rules. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling 
Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (objections to discovery requests and 
interrogatories based upon China's state secrecy laws, first raised seven months after the requests 
and interrogatories were served, had been waived; "[i Jt is well established that a failure to object 
to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection"); Davis v. 
Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981) ("in the absence of an extension of time or good 
cause, the failure to object to interrogatories within the time fixed by Ruic 33, F.R.Civ.P., 
constitutes a waiver of any objection. This is true even an objection that the information 
sought is F states " ... [alny not a 
cause, excuses 
Cedillo is not requesting the Court state a bright line rule. Rather, the Court should 
provide the District Court with discretion and enumerate the factors to be considered by the 
District Court in deciding this type of discovery dispute. Cedillo believes that the facts of this 
case can only lead the Court to conclude that Farmers objections have been waived. 
2. Farmers failed to substantiate its privilege claims. 
Even if considered timely, Farmers has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish 
its claims of privilege. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(A) "Privileged Information Withheld" provides the 
following: 
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules by 
claiming it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the 
party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of documents, 
communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without 
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to 
assess the applicability of the privilege or protection. 
The burden is on Farmers to demonstrate how each document or communication is 
privileged. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 704 P.2d (2005); Naviganl Consulting Inc. 
220 F.R.D. 467, 473 (N.I). Tex. 2004). A general allegation of privilege is insufficient to meet 
this burden. Id. Instead, a clear showing must be made which sets forth the items or categories 
objected to and the reasons that objection. Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 256 P.3d 
755 (2011) (document in question was clearly intended to be privileged). 
Farmers' privilege log of December 6, 2013 failed to provide any facts that could have 
assisted the District Court in determining whether any privilege exists. Although a more 
an in camera 
failed to of the state 
reasons 
, 1212 an in camera was 
appropriate but only if Farmers had submitted detailed affidavits or other evidence supporting its 
privilege claims in a timely fashion. 
Significantly, Farmers has not shown how the attorney-client or work product privilege 
applies to any of the documents withheld. Instead, Farmers offered only its Privilege Log dated 
December 6, 2016, and its blanket assertion by its attorney that these papers were privileged. 
Farmers provided no details surrounding its investigation and handling of Cedillo's claim and, 
therefore, no facts on which its claim of privilege were based. 
Instead, Farmers merely assumed that documents relating to its handling of Ccdillo's 
claim arc protected from disclosure. Such a categorical approach to privilege issues is improper. 
Ex: Parle Niday, 15 Idaho 559, 98 P. 845 (1908); Navigant Consulting, 220 F.R.D. at 474. 
A proper privilege log would include the identity and position of the person who authored 
the document, the date, the nature of the document, the recipient of the document, and all 
information other than the actual content so that the objection or privilege claim may be 
evaluated by the court. 
This lack of proof alone justifies denial of Farrhers· privilege claims. Without evidence 
explaining the documents and how the infcmnation contained therein is confidential and 
communicated for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the Court is left with no option but to 
order the production of all documents. communications, papers. and things related to Cedillo ·s 
UIM claim. 
states following: 
[f any document, information or data of any kind pertaining to the Claim, the 
clain1s-hand!ing or under\vriting activities, or any reports, con11nunications, or 
data of any kind, arc maintained on any electronic media, such as computer 
data files, electronic mail, or any equivalent, identify the contents of such 
electronically-stored information, the location, and whether or not hard copies 
of such material exist. 
Farmers' Answer to Interrogatory No. 9 states the following: 
Attachment Nos. 1-9 were maintained electronically. A hard copy of 
Attachment No. l O exists anct would have been in Cedillo's possession. I lard 
copies of Attachment Nos. 1 through 9 have been made in order to respond to 
Cedillo's discovery. Hard copies of any portions of the electronic file would 
not have been made except to provide copies of such things as medical 
records to UIM defense counselor experts. 
9 
Farmers' Answer to Ccdillo's [nterrogatory No. 9 docs not include an objection. 
Farmers took it upon itself to determine what ESI was responsive to Ccdillo's discovery. 
The rules governing the compilation and the production of ESI require Farmers to identify its IT 
infrastructure and storage devices, key players and custodians, and the locations of all 
information relevant to this litigation. Cedillo is entitled to confirmation of Farmers' spoliation 
and preservation efforts, Cedillo is entitled to participate in the selection of the time frame, 
scope, and list of search terms used by Farmers for searching, harvesting, and processing its ESI, 
and is also entitled to know what quality control or quality assurance, or verification 
measures, were taken by Farmers to ensure the precision and reasonableness of Farmers' search 
and effr)rts. 
has failed to comply with discovery request and I.R.C.P. 34(a) and 34(b). 
Cedillo requests the Court order Farmers to answer Cedilla's ES[ discovery request m 
[. and 34(b). 
claims adjustor Ramsey arc not or protected. 
Farmers' Privilege Log lists papers prepared by its claims adjuster Ramsey. There is no 
basis for Farmers to claim these papers as privileged. "[C]ourts have routinely recognized that 
the investigation and evaluation of claims is part of the regular, ordinary, and principal business 
of insurance companies.'· Piatkowski v. Abdon Callais qff,shore, LLC, No. Civ. A. 99-3759, 
2000 WL 1145825 at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 2000). "[E]ven though litigation is pending or may 
eventually ensue does not cloak such routinely generated documents with work product 
protection." Piarkowski, 2000 WL 1145825 at*2, and Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 F.R.D. 115, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1972). 
Additionally, because an insurance company's normal course of business includes 
investigating and evaluating claims on its contracts, courts hold that documents constituting any 
part of a factual inquiry into or evaluation of a claim, undertaken in order to arrive at a claim 
decision, arc prepared in the ordinary course of an insurer's business and arc therefore not work 
product. An insurance company cannot reasonably argue that its claim files arc accumulated in 
anticipation of litigation when it has a duty to investigate, evaluate, and make a decision with 
respect to claims made on it by its insured (here, Cedillo). 
Farmers should be ordered to produce the unredacted papers of claims adjuster Ramsey. 
5. arc not or 
Farmers bases its claim of privilege on the ground that Mr. Thomson is an attorney and 
therefore reasons that all papers that Mr. Thomson participated in arc privileged. I lowever, 
'[tlhc burden of infrmnation is privileged, and therefore, exempt discovery. is on 
party asserting the ,. Kirk v. Ford 1\10/or Co .. 141 [daho 697, 701, 116 P 31 
is not to a 
lawyer." Divers(fied Indus. Inc v. ~Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977). 
These issues have recently been addressed by the Washington Supreme Court in the case 
of Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686, 295 P.3d 239 (2013). 
The central issue in Cede!! was the application and scope of the attorney-client privilege in a 
claim for insurance bad faith, the same issue now facing this Court. Cedell 's analysis of the 
issues have been cited with approval by US District Court Judge B. Lynn Winmill in the case of 
Stewart Title Guaranty Company v. Credit Suisse (R., p. 498) and in the case of Hilborn v. 
Metropolitan Group Property and Casualty Insurance Co. (R., p. 498). 
In Cedell the plaintiff filed a claim with Farmers Insurance after his home burned down. 
Farmers hired attorney Ryan Hall to provide coverage advice and also to investigate the claim. 
Farmers delayed paying the claim, prompting Cedell to sue them for bad faith. In discovery, 
Cedell sought to compel production of communications between Farmers and its attorney Hall. 
Farmers objected on the ground of privilege, claiming that attorney Hall was retained to give 
legal advice on coverage issues. 
The Washington Supreme Court sitting en bane, rejected Farmers' broad claim of 
privilege. The Court began its analysis by discussing what information the insured needs in 
order to pursue his bad faith action: 
The insured needs access to the insurer's file maintained for the insured in order 
to discover facts to support a claim of bad faith. [mplicit in an insurance 
company's handling of claims is litigation or the threat of litigation that involves 
the advice of counsel. To permit a blanket privilege in an insurance bad faith 
claim because of the participation of lawyers hired or employed by insurers would 
Pauc 30 b. 
unreasonab I y 
presumptively, the claims file. specifically, "[ w]e start from 
presumption that there is no attorney-client privilege relevant between the insured and the insurer 
in the c!airns adjusting process ... " ~rhe insurer n1ay overco1nc the prcsu1nption of discovcrability 
by showing that "its attorney was not engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and 
evaluating or processing the claim, but was instead providing the insurer with counsel as to its 
own potential liability; fi.)r example, whether or not coverage exists under the law." "Upon such 
a showing, the insurance company is entitled to the redaction of communications from counsel 
that reflected the mental impressions of the attorney to the insurance company, unless those 
mental impressions are directly at issue in their quasi-fiduciary responsibilities to their insured." 
In this case, Farmers has made no attempt to overcome the presumption of 
discovcrability. The Court file is devoid of any facts justifying Farmers' privilege claims, and in 
this case the mental impressions of Farmers' attorney, Mr. Thomson, arc directly at issue. 
In its Response to Ccdillo's Request for Admission No. 138, Farmers denies that attorney 
Thomson was hired to provide coverage advice. R .. pp. 291. 756. This admission alone, if not 
conclusive, is a factor for the Court to consider that negates any claim that attorney Thomson 
was engaged in a privileged capacity. 
As an example of the routine claim handling work performed by attorney Thomson, the 
Court is directed to attorney Thomson's letter to Cedillo, dated December 28, 20 l 0, concerning 
an independent medical exam ("Ron Ramsey requested that I assist him in setting up an 
independent medical exam"). IC p. 141. 
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Farmers, will point the Court to following statement found the 
special considerations first party bad faith 
claims, except for under insured motorist (UIM) claims, the insured is entitled to 
access to the claims file ... [W]e recognize a difference between UIM bad faith 
claims and other first party bad faith claims. The UIM insurer steps into the shoes 
of the tortfeasor and may defend as the tortfeasor would defend. Thus, in the UIM 
context, the insurance company is entitled to counsel's advice in stratcgizing the 
same defenses that the tortfeasor could have asserted. However, even in a claim 
alleging bad faith in handling of a UIM claim, there are limits to the insurer's 
attorney-client privilege. 
Id. at 245. 
The limits referred to by the Washington Supreme Court are, first, a timely attorney-
client privilege claim; second, which complies with l.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(A); and third, a fraud or 
bad faith allegation by the insured. The Cedell Court, in footnote 4 at page 252, clarifies this 
reference to fraud by its statement that ' [ s]ince conduct short of fraud constitutes bad faith, 
requiring a threshold showing of fraud to reach critical evidence requires too much." The Cedell 
Court also states that "[i]n the context of first party insurance, bad faith may often be tantamount 
to civil fraud.'' Id. at 252. 
Farmers fails to fit within the UIM exception described by the Washington Supreme 
Court for at least six reasons. First, Farmers' privilege claims were untimely. Second, Farmers' 
privilege log fails to comply with I.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(A). Third, Cedillo's allegations arc clearly 
allegations of bad faith. Fourth, Cedillo has demonstrated substantial need and undue hardship 
in obtaining substantially equivalent materials by other means. In other vvords, Farmers is the 
one and only source of the materials sought. Fifth, Farmers' breach of its UIM insurance 
contract with Cedillo was proven at arbitration and confirmed by both the District Court and this 
Court. The breach of its U insurance contract been established and is the of this case. 
It is the " ... 's advice in strategizing the same defenses UIM tortfcasor 
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contract arbitration, mental 
impressions, could not compromise Farmers' defense in that case as the underlying UIM breach 
of contract litigation has been concluded in Cedillo's favor. Sixth, in the underlying contractual 
UIM claim which was resolved in Cedillo's favor, Farmers was " ... entitled to counsel's advice 
in strategizing the same defense that the tortfeasor could have asserted ... " but in this case, 
Farmers did not assert the same defense that the tortfcasor could have asserted there was never 
an issue of liability or comparative negligence defense. R., p. 143-145. In the Arbitration 
Stipulation, Farmers agreed its liability under its UIM contract was not an issue. R., p. 145. 
Farmers also agreed that comparative fault was not an issue. R., p. 145. 
Farmers has also failed to establish the applicability of the work-product doctrine which 
is overcome upon a showing of need. Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins., 976 F.2d 
573, 577 (9111 Cir. 1992) ("[OJpinion work product may be discovered and admitted when mental 
impressions are al issue in a case and the need for the material is compelling" ( emphasis in 
original). Both clements arc met in a bad faith insurance claim settlement case as the 
" ... strategy, mental impressions and opinion of [the insurer's] agents concerning the handling of 
the claim arc directly at issue." Id. The documents sought by Cedillo were merely the materials 
ordinarily included in an insurer's claim file. See. Pete Rinaldi ·s Fast Food v. Great Amer. Ins. 
Cos .. 123 F.R.D 198, 202 (M.D.N.C. 1988) ("Because an insurance company has a duty in the 
ordinary course of business to investigate and evaluate claims made by its insured, the claims 
files containing such documents usually cannot be entitled to work product protection.'} 
There is no other way for to this information as it is in the 
Farmers. v. Houston 11 
17, 2011) that existed for producing product 
case where information was in "exclusive control'' of insurer and insured had "no other way to 
probe reasons [insurer] denied [the insurcd's] claim"). 
B. The District Court Erred When It Awarded Summary Judgment to Farmers on the 
"Fairlv Debatable" Issue. 
The third issue to be resolved by this Court is what constitutes the required bad faith 
element of "fairly debatable." 
In relation to the issue of whether a claim is fairly debatable, "an insurer does not act in 
bad faith if it declines to pay sums that arc reasonably in dispute. Lucas v. Stale Farm Fire & 
Gas. Co., 13 l Idaho 674, 677, 963 P.2d 357, 360 (1998)." Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC 
v. Hartfhrd Fire Ins. Ca., 153 [daho 716, 721, 291 P.3d 399,404 (2012). "Rather, a claim for 
bad faith arises only where an insurer intentionally denies or delays payment, even though the 
insured's claim is not fairly debatable. Robinson, 137 Idaho at 176-77, 45 P.3d at 832-33 (citing 
Anderson, 130 Idaho at 759,947 P.2d at 1007)." Id. at 721-22, 291 P.3d at 404-405. 
Thus, "an insurer docs not act in bad faith if it challenges the validity of a 'fairly 
debatable' claim or when the delay results from honest mistakes." Roper v. State Farm Mui. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 131 [daho 459, 461, 958 P.2d 1145, 114 7 ( 1998) ( citing White v. Unigard 1\,fut. 
Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 100, 730 P.2d. 1014, 1020 (1986)); sec also Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co. 
c~fidaho, 130 Idaho 755,759,947 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1997) ("Good faith and fair dealing with an 
insured docs not include the payment of sums that arc reasonably in dispute, but only the 
payment of legitimate damages.''). "Therefore, if payment of the bills is reasonably in dispute, 
an by msurance as to the causal between the 
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condition and the accident, and eventually a determination that the conditions arc not causally 
to create a Roper, 31 at 
8 at 1147-48. 
Farmers' 1\;fotionfiJr Summmy Judgment made the following contentions: 
a. That Cedillo did not provide Farmers with the necessary information and/or produce 
documents in a prompt manner with regard to her medical providers and her wage 
loss claim to allow for Farmers evaluation. 
b. That there was medical evidence of pre-existing injuries to Ms. Cedillo's shoulder 
and neck - the same injuries she alleged were caused by the accident. 
c. That legitimate questions and differences of opinion existed over the causation and 
effect of Ms. Cedillo's injuries which affected the value of her claim. 
Farmers contends that for these three reasons Ccdillo's claim was "fairly debatable." At 
the outset, Cedillo and the Court must note that Farmers moved for summary judgment on only 
one element of Cedillo's claim for bad faith: that is, that Cedillo's claim was fairly debatable. 
Farmers' Motion for Summmy Judgment was a regurgitation of its speculative, improbable, and 
inconsistent testimony offered in arbitration and rejected by Arbitrator Clark. 
The "fairly debatable" issue is not limited to medical issues. If it were, there would be no 
bad faith tort in Idaho; every insurance defense answer includes the defenses of pre-existing 
condition and aggravation of pre-existing condition. By simply including these boiler plate 
defenses in its answer to a complaint has the insurer created a "fairly debatable" issue which 
insulates it from a bad faith claim? 
Cedillo contends the answer is no. In its defense an insurer may not fabricate issues. 






Arbitration. The reports / opm1on letters attached to the Affidavit of Wilson, Affzdavit of 
Williams, and the Affidavit c~f Purvis were not offered as evidence in the Arbitration. Had they 
been offered they would have been refused as inadmissible hearsay. 
At Arbitration Farmers' "expert witnesses" presented a masterful spin of selected but 
incomplete facts advancing a talc which was simply unbelievable. The Arbitrator heard the full 
story and the complete factual scenario of this case, and rejected every piece of evidence and 
testimony offered by Farmers. This was not a close call for the Arbitrator, as can be seen in his 
decisions. 
Farmers' testimony was provided by paid, biased actors. The Arbitrator had the right to, 
and did, disregard the testimony of Wilson, Williams, and Purvis. 
Arbitrator Clark judged Farmers' and Ccdillo's evidence upon the requirements of I.R.E. 
702 and whether the scientific basis for such evidence was reliable. Arbitrator Clark found that 
Farmers' "expert" witness testimony was inconsistent with the evidence offered by Ccdillo's 
three (3) treating (not retained) medical experts. Farmers' "expert" witness testimony lacked any 
evidentiary basis, was improbable, was pure speculation, and/or was based upon possibilities and 
not evidence. Arbitrator Clark judged the weight of Farmers' and Cedillo's evidence based upon 
the qualifications of the witness, the opportunity of the witness for observation and opinions, the 
overall accuracy of the statements made by the witness, and the integrity of the witness and flatly 
rejected every bit of testimony offered by Farmers' hired actors. Arbitrator Clark's January 16, 
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13, a and complete analysis of of (3) 
111 case which to 
to a jury. In addition, the facts of this case have been reviewed by Mr. Irving "Buddy" Paul, who 
has been qualified as an expert on bad faith in numerous other bad faith cases in the state of 
Idaho and other states, both in federal and state courts. Mr. Paul unequivocally states that the 
clements of bad faith are present in this case and that the acts and omissions of Farmers were an 
extreme deviation from industry standards, were the result of malice, and constituted outrageous 
conduct. R., p. 1681. 
Ccdillo's expert, Mr. Paul, cites numerous examples of actions or inactions taken by 
Farmers he found to be unreasonable and outrageous. Mr. Paul noted Farmers' failure to use the 
medical authorizations executed by Cedillo to obtain medical records, its failure to seek objective 
medical opinions, and its purposefully ignoring Cedillo's three (3) treating physicians' opinions. 
Mr. Paul also found that the time it took Farmers to adjust and pay Cedillo's claim was grossly 
deviant from generally accepted insurance industry's standards in the state ofldaho. 
Mr. Paul's deposition testimony lists Farmers' conduct which violated insurance industry 
standards as practiced in Idaho, which was self-serving, which was outrageous, malicious, which 
delayed and denied amounts fairly owed to Cedillo, and which violated the Idaho Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Act (Idaho Code §41-1329). R. pp. 1828-1842. 
Farmers' conduct includes not only its fabricated medical issues but also its overly 
zealous and unfounded assertions concernrng Cedillo 's proof of loss, its unreasonable and 
unfounded prejudgment interest contentions, its accusations of collusion and its delays in paying 
Cedillo the amount justly due her. . 
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to 
security of the protection paid 
In the words of Mr. Buddy Paul, Farmers' claim file evidences lack of investigation, 
outright intransigence and maliciousness, and makes it undeniably clear that Farmers had no 
interest in being fair to Cedillo. 
The issues raised in Farmers' Motion.for Summmy Judgment were resolved in arbitration. 
The Arbitrator considered Farmers' contentions and found them to be unsupported by any 
evidence. The District Court confirmed the Arbitrator's decision. This court affirmed the 
District Court in its confirmation of the Arbitration. 
In the District Court's ruling of November 30, 2015, Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Summmy Judgment on Count III, the following is found: 
"The Court begins with the issue of res judicata (i.e. was this issue dealt with as 
part of binding arbitration), as it appears to be dispositive of all issues. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment on Count Ill, 
filed November 30, 2015 at p. 9 section B Res Judicata. 
The District Court's cited 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments§ 519, W !dus. & Envtl. Servs., Inc., 
126 Idaho 541,544, 887 P. 2d 1048, 1051 (1994), and Idaho Code §7-914, as authority fr)r its 
determination that claim preclusion barred Cedillo's claim concerning the "offset clause." 
That same logic and legal authority precludes Farmers from raising the issues addressed 
in its Motion.for Surnmmy Judgment. The trial of those issues is over and Farmers lost. 
Farmers' UIM contract binds it to the results of the arbitration. Farmers' UIM contract 
containing the arbitration clause is intended to simplify and provide a speedy, less expensive 
conclusion to legitimate disputes between Farmers and its insureds. In Cedillo's case, Farmers 
abused the arbitration by unreasonable delay, unreasonable denial, and unreasonable 
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Binding arbitration, which the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the bias 
of witnesses, is to claims. Whether 
claim was "fairly debatable" or not has been Cedilla's favor and is not an 
lSSUe. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied CediHo's Motion to Add a Punitive 
Cedillo urges this Court rightfully conclude that she has established a reasonable 
likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages against 
Farmers, and allow her pleadings to be amended to pray for such relief The jury may ultimately 
find against Cedillo, but at this point that is not the determinative issue. Idaho Code § 6-1604(2) 
only requires that Cedillo present evidence that would support an award of punitive damages if 
the jury determines. Mr. Paul's Expert Report, Farmers' own files, and its discovery responses 
provide that requisite evidence. 
In this publication entitled "Insurance Bad Faith," The Honorable D. Duff McKee, a 
senior judge in the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho, said the following about the appropriateness 
of punitive damages in a bad faith case: 
" ... conduct that is not only indifferent but is also calculated to work to the 
advantage of the insurer elevates the circumstances considerably. u: in addition, 
the insured is placed at a special disadvantage by the indifferent conduct, and the 
insurer is made aware of the disadvantage and still persists, the circumstances arc 
elevated even further. 
In assessing a potential claim for punitive damages, a determination in 
favor of alleging punitive damages ordinarily will require the presence of the 
following circumstances: 
(a) The conduct under examination breached a duty owed; 
(b) As a result of the breach, the position of the insurer was advanced at the 
expense of its insured; 
( c) The insured was harmed or placed at a disadvantage by the conduct, of 
which the insurer was aware 
( d) The circumstances demonstrate an egregious breach, under the standards 
applicable for punitive damages. 
A common example of cases in which punitive damages may be involves 
delay in payment of the loss. The insurer is entitled to a "reasonable" time to 
determine and pay losses due. However, if it takes an excessive amount of time, 
it has breached its duty. Delay in payment works to the advantage of the insurer; 
this is elementary economics. ff the insured has been forced to forgo an 
opportunity or endure a hardship during this interim, the delay works to the 
disadvantage of the insured, and if the insurer is or should be aware of this harm, 
conditions (a), (b), and (c) satisfied. 
The final test, ( d), is one of common sense. Taken as a whole, are the 
circumstances such as to constitute an outrageous affront to the sensibilities of the 
ordinary person? In answering this question, the adjectives embedded within the 
punitive damage standards are instructive: "extreme" deviation, "reckless" disregard, 
"callous" indifference, "gross" negligence, and the like. 
18 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, 323 at 327 
1. Cedillo's expert testimony concerning punitive damages. 
In support of Cedilla's motion to add claim for punitive damages, Cedillo relied upon the 
expert report submitted by Mr. Paul. R. pp. 1877-1886. Mr. Paul cites numerous examples of 
Farmers' failure to timely adjust Cedilla's claim. Such examples include, but are not limited to, 
the following: 
Mr. Paul's Expert Report unequivocally establishes that Farmers' course of conduct with 
respect to handling and processing Cedilla's claim was oppressive, fraudulent, malicious, and 
outrageous. Mr. Paul's Expert Report established that there is a reasonable likelihood of proving 
facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. 
2. Farmers' unreasonable conduct cause harm to Cedillo. 
The damages suffered by Cedillo as a result of Farmers' material breach of its insurance 
contract will be more particularly proven at the time of trial and include, but are not limited to, 
the following: 
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(1) Arbitration costs: 
Bad 




To be determined by Jury. 
3. There is a special relationship between Farmers and Cedillo. 
Our Supreme Court identified the relationship between an insured and msurance as 
special, a quasi-fiduciary relationship. The delay or denial of payments is the heart of bad faith. 
White v. Unigard 1vfut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho, 94 730 P.2d 1014 (1986); Robinson v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173 45 P.3d 829 (2002). That is what bad faith is all about. In 
this case, the denial and delay commenced on July 28, 2009 (the Proof of Loss date) and 
continued to March 5, 2015. In both Inland Group v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 135 
Idaho 249 258, 985 P.2d 674, 683 (1999), and Chester v. State Farm Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 538, 
789 P.2d 534 ( 1990), the delays were only a matter of months; yet, in those cases the insurers 
were held to be guilty of bad faith. 
In this case, the delays are years-longer than in either Chester or Inland, and Cedillo has 
confidence that a jury will find that the delays and denials were unreasonable. 
4. There is proof that Farmers continues its oppressive, outrageous conduct. 
The expert report of Mr. Paul concludes that Farmers has failed to adopt and implement 
reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies, a 
violation of [daho Code §41-1329(3). R. p. 1901. It should be obvious that as Farmers has no 
reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims that its oppressive conduct will 
continue until it adopts and enforces reasonable standards. 
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of 
a multi-million dollar, 
full knowledge of the likely consequences conduct. 
Cedillo is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-
1839(1) and Idaho Code§ 41-2502. 
,_fhe District Court a\varded Cedillo attorney fees incurred in the arbitration tinder Idaho 
Code §41-1839. This Court awarded Cedillo attorney fees in the prior appeal of Farmers under 
Idaho Code § 41-1839. Cedillo reasonably expects to prevail in this appeal and is therefore 
entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §41-1839 and the public 
policy ofldaho Code §41-2502 requiring UIM insurance. 
The legislature has mandated UIM insurance coverage. Issues concerning UIM insurance 
are matters of public policy. It will further the public policy of requiring U[M insurance 
coverage to resolve the issues Cedillo brings before the Court and to award Cedillo attorney fees. 
Vil. 
CONCLUSION 
Farmers' claim file, rather than documenting assistance to Cedillo, instead documents 
Farmers' deliberate, lengthy, and extreme efforts to ignore, delay, deny, and defend against 
Ccdillo's valid UIM claim. Cedillo urges this Court to order the production of Farmers' entire 
claim file. 
Farmers' ongoing arguments attempting to justify its conduct arc unconscionable and 
outrageous. Farmers' arguments demonstrate its cavalier, reckless, outrageous, and malicious 
treatment of its policyholder. Farmers' documents prove that Cedillo was severely injured, was 
incurring over $100,000 in medical expenses, and that Farmers had no legitimate reason to 
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delay, or defend against Cedilla's UIM claim. Yet, that is what it has done for the 
begrudgingly made payments to Cedillo, which were past due. Incredibly, 
Farmers' payment of $101,947.00 on September 11, 2013 was made with Farmers' reservation to 
seek reimbursement. R. pp. 1076, 1812. This conduct contradicts Farmers' duty to never place 
its own financial interests ahead of its policyholders' interests. 
Farmers' conduct has been reprehensible, has been intentionally indifferent to and 
completely in disregard of its promises to faithfully provide Cedillo with the comfort and 
security of the protection she paid for. 
In the words of Mr. Buddy Paul, Farmers' claim file evidences lack of investigation, 
outright intransigence and maliciousness, and makes it undeniably clear that Farmers had no 
interest in being fair to Cedillo. R. p. 1897-1901. The District Court erred in granting Farmers' 
summary judgment and should be reversed. As the record clearly proves, Cedillo is also entitled 
to amend her complaint to include a punitive damage claim. Cedillo is also entitled to an award 
of attorney fees. 
DATED this day of August 2016. 
RUN FT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Respondent 
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correct copy of the foregoing BRlEF in the 
method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Jack Gjording 
Julianne Hall 
Gjording & rouser, PLLC 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 600 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, [0 83 70 l 
Attorney/hr Farmers Insurance Company 
Ofldaho 
Via Facsimile --
-- Via Personal Delivery 
Via U.S. Mail --
Via E-mail 
--
a true and 
matter the 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFF[CES, PLLC 
By:_~~'---+-
JON M. stE 
Attorney for Cedillo-Appellant 
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